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Abstract
The ”green paradox” literature points out that environmental policies which are antici-
pated to become gradually more stringent over time may induce a more rapid extraction
of fossil fuels, thus having a detrimental effect to the environment. The manifestation
of such phenomena has been extensively studied in the case of taxes directly applied to
the extraction of a polluting non-renewable resource and of subsidies applied to its non-
polluting substitutes. This paper examines the effects of subsidies to ”clean” R&D activi-
ties, aimed to improve the productivity of non-polluting substitutes. We borrow standard
assumptions from the directed-technical-change literature to take a full account of the pri-
vate incentives to perform R&D and of the patterns of complementarity/substitutability
between dirty resource and clean non-resource sectors. We show that a gradual increase
in relative subsidies to clean R&D activities does not have the adverse green paradox ef-
fect, which contradicts an earlier made conjecture. Instead, the presence of several R&D
sectors implies arbitrages which give rise to other quite paradoxical results. However
substitutable or complementary sectors are, and whatever the induced technological bias
is, clean-R&D-support policies always enhance the long-run productivity of the resource
and thus result in a less rapid extraction.
JEL classification: Q32; O32; O41
Keywords: Non-renewable resources; Directed technical change; Environmental policy;
Green paradox; R&D subsidies.
1. Introduction
The so-called ”green paradox” phenomenon refers to the fact that anticipated policies
aimed to reduce the demand for an exhaustible resource result in this resource being
exploited more rapidly. It is well known that when such resources are polluting – as
are fossil fuels – free markets already tend to consume them too rapidly (Withagen,
1994). Hence, policies which entail a green paradox phenomenon further deteriorate the
environment and are thus obviously sub-optimal.1 Hans-Werner Sinn (2008) coined the
expression meaning that ”good intentions do not always breed good deeds” (p. 380).
Such phenomena may arise from several types of demand-reducing policies. In his
formal analysis, Sinn (2008) has focused on taxation policies applied to a non-renewable
resource when those policies leave the total amount to be ultimately extracted unaffected.
In such Hotellian contexts, as he shows, tax instruments that are sufficiently rising over
time – whether they are applied on cash flows or directly on resource quantities – induce
a more rapid extraction.2 Thus, an anticipated gradual introduction of environmental
policies, or the anticipation that environmental policies will be implemented from some
future dates on, might result in an undesired faster extraction.
Sinn (2008) anticipated the result to carry over to the case of any demand-reducing
policies; in particular, to subsidies to resource substitutes and to technical improve-
ments in the production of those substitutes. Most of following contributions have dealt
1An exact evaluation of policies’ environmental impacts requires an explicit assessment of their effects
on pollution and on social welfare (e.g. Hoel, 2010; Gerlagh, 2011; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012).
Following Sinn (2008) and Grafton, Kompas and Long (2012), a meaningful simplification consists in
assessing whether policies enhance or reduce the speed at which the resource is extracted. Environmental
policies which contribute to solving the environmental problem slow down the extraction of polluting
resources; vice versa policies inducing a more rapid extraction are detrimental to the environment. This
simple criterion has been considered to give a good intuition on whether policies are environmentally
successful or not, contributing to the popularity of the green paradox problem as initially formulated by
Sinn (2008).
2The reasoning goes as follows. A constant tax rate applied to cash flows is neutral because it
amounts to a conventional profit tax on the total-discounted-profit objective. Absent any extraction
cost, a constant-present-value levy on the resource is formally identical to a constant cash-flow tax.
Even with non-zero extraction costs, there exists a continuum of neutral tax paths (Dasgupta et al.,
1981). All those extraction taxes are neutral for the same reason that they affect the equilibrium price
in such a way that the equilibrium Hotelling rule remains satisfied without any further readjustments
of quantities; in particular, they leave the producers’ profit-maximizing extraction unchanged. Tax
trajectories that are rising more rapidly than those neutral ones cause a more rapid extraction (see also
the comprehensive analysis of Gaudet and Lasserre, 1990).
with subsidies to resources’ clean substitutes while extending the traditional partial-
equilibrium resource-depletion setting in several respects (e.g. Gerlagh, 2011; Grafton,
Kompas and Long, 2012; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012; among others).3
There are three basic ways by which the demand for a commodity can be affected.
The first one is to directly modify its price through taxation policies directly applied on
its flows, in the spirit of Sinn (2008). Quite relatedly, the second one is to affect the price
of its substitutes, in the spirit of Gerlagh (2011), Grafton et al. (2012) and van der Ploeg
and Withagen (2012). Those two ways consist in modifying the price arguments of the
demand function; using partial-equilibrium settings where the technology is given, they
have been extensively analyzed by the above studies.
The third way to affect the demand for a commodity is the object of this paper: it
consists in modifying the demand function itself instead of its price arguments. Macroe-
conomic demand drivers are arguably as strong as price incentives in the determination
of the global demand for oil. Demand depends on the currently available technology; in a
long-run perspective, the technology results from prior research and development (R&D)
investments. The long-run dynamic mechanisms by which private research efforts respond
to economic incentives have been highlighted by the economic growth literature. As this
literature shows, such economic incentives do not affect all sectors in the same fashion
(Acemoglu, 2002): research investments are directed to specific sectors; understanding
the intricate process by which a particular sector is affected by endogenous R&D requires
to assume that innovations are sector specific.
Acemoglu’s concept of directed technical change has received a particular attention
in resource economics. Indeed, directed-technical-change models disentangle the specific
factors favoring the production of clean substitutes from those enhancing the productivity
of dirty resources. Then, by refining the patterns of substitutability and complementarity
between sectors, it permits to more precisely describe the role of R&D in the switch
from the use of depletable resources to the use of producible (gross) substitutes. Major
3Grafton et al. (2012) introduced decreasing-returns-to-scale in a substitute production, arising from
land-supply limitations. Gerlagh (2011) and van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012) departed from the
Hotelling assumption of resource homogeneity and examined the induced dynamics of pollution.
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applications include, among others, Andre´ and Smulders (2004), Hart (2004), Grimaud
and Rouge´ (2008), Di Maria and Valente (2008) and Pittel and Bretschger (2010). The
most recent contribution on the issue is Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn and Hemous’ (2012)
paper.
Subsidies to research investments are generally advocated by the economic growth
literature4, yet irrespective of whether these investments aim to favor clean or dirty sec-
tors. Subsidies to environmentally friendly research activities – enhancing productivity
in non-polluting substitute sectors – affect the demand of polluting-resource inputs only
indirectly; therefore, absent any constraints on the implementation of optimal environ-
mental policies, they must not have any Pigovian dimension. In the presence of policy
implementation difficulties however (perhaps related to green paradox phenomena), they
may contribute to alleviate the environmental problem arising from polluting-resource
use. On this ground, they can be advocated as not-too-bad substitutes to direct environ-
mental policies (e.g. Grimaud, Lafforgue and Magne´, 2011). In general, as Smulders and
Di Maria (2012) recently pointed out, induced technical change interacts with pollution-
generating inputs’ demand in a very intricate way.5
Intellectual property rights confer sector-specific innovation activities the dimension of
competing economic projects. The equilibrium allocation of efforts to polluting-resource-
improving and to clean-substitute-improving R&D sectors is determined by no-arbitrage
conditions involving the inclusive-of-subsidies returns to investments in both sectors. In
this context, we show that the effects of relative subsidies to research efforts is not so intu-
itive. The equilibrium no-arbitrage requirement implies that any support to one specific
R&D sector entails necessary compensations to the other sectors. As a result, depending
4By providing incentives to increase otherwise sub-optimal R&D investments, they alleviate standard
endogenous-growth distortions.
5As they show, the interaction between environmental policies and technological changes they induce
leads to counter-intuitive effects even in models where there is a single aggregated R&D sector. Their
analysis mainly focuses on the effects of environmental policies, taking into account endogenous techno-
logical adjustments. In contrast, we focus on policies directly supporting a specific R&D sector. In the
standard two-sector CES-technology framework of the directed-technical-change literature, exogenous
technical improvements in the clean sector can be shown to satisfy Smulders and Di Maria’s definition
of ”brown” technologies regardless of sectors’ substitutability/complementarity. In our intertemporal
Hotelling model, extraction patterns are not only governed by the absolute effect of technological change
on resource demand, but further depend on these effects at all dates relative to each other.
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on whether production sectors are substitutable or complementary, supporting the clean-
substitute R&D sector affects positively or negatively the relative contribution of the
clean-substitute production sector. However, the overall effect of R&D-support policies
on resource demand is irrespective of sectors’ degree of substitutability/complementarity.
In any dynamic equilibrium, we find that a gradual, more-and-more stringent support
to R&D activities aimed to improve productivity in clean substitutes sectors induces,
among other effects, a less rapid resource extraction. Our result sharply contrasts with
the commonly-made conjecture that technical improvements in the production of resource
substitutes are tantamount to other policies aimed to reduce the demand for the resource.
Taking a full account of incentives to perform R&D requires to consider the endoge-
nous process by which the productivity of both the resource and its substitutes is deter-
mined by specific R&D sectors. Our analysis suggests that the endogeneity of technical
change is crucial to study the effects of supporting the development of resource and re-
source substitutes sectors. To set up our model, we borrow very standard assumptions
from the recent literature on directed technical change and the environment. Our frame-
work is largely inspired from Acemoglu et al.’s (2012) analysis.
We modify Acemoglu et al.’s (2012) model so as to examine the effects of specific R&D-
support policies on non-renewable-resource extraction patterns in a single setup involving
the minimal ingredients determining those effects: two production sectors combine to
produce a unique final good; each of them is associated with a specific R&D sector; one
of them (dirty) consumes flows of a non-renewable resource; the other one (clean) relies
on flows of a renewable source of energy.
Unlike their model, the time dimension is continuous, which requires some minor
adjustments which basically amount to a redefinition of the time scale. For simplicity,
we assume away the allocation of unskilled labor to the two production sectors. The
allocation of economic resources to these sectors is completely summarized by that of
intermediate goods. Nevertheless, the allocation of research (labor) efforts to the two
R&D sectors retains its central role identified by the directed-technical-change literature.
In general-equilibrium endogenous-growth models integrating an exhaustible-resource
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sector, it is standard to assume that extraction costs are negligible.6 With such a common
approximation, traditional growth models still deliver good intuitions while preserving
the regularity properties which are required in a long-run-growth perspective. In general,
environmental policies affect the ultimately extracted resource quantity, either because
some reserve units become uneconomic (e.g. Hoel, 2010; Gerlagh, 2011; van der Ploeg and
Withagen, 2012) or because of lower exploration and development efforts (e.g. Daubanes
and Lasserre, 2012).7 For its purpose is to emphasize the role of R&D processes in a
long-run-growth perspective, the present paper gives priority to the study of policies’
effects on the speed of resource exploitation, at the expense of those on how much is
ultimately depleted. As the above contributions show, a reduction of total extraction can
easily be achieved with conventional environmental policies applied to the resource or to
its substitutes directly.
The analysis is organized as follows. Section 2 exposes the setup. Section 3 analyzes
the function by which resource demand is determined and identifies its macroeconomic
drivers. Section 4 focuses on the effects of increased relative subsidies to clean R&D
activities on the economy’s structure. Section 5 combines the results of Sections 3 and
4 and integrates the intertemporal dimension of resource extraction to deliver the main
message of the paper. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
At each date t of the continuous set [0,+∞), the competitive final sector produces a
quantity Y (t) of final good using a ”clean” input Yc(t) and a ”dirty” input Yd(t), according
to the CES aggregate production function
Y (t) =
[
Yc(t)
(ε−1)/ε + Yd(t)(ε−1)/ε
]ε/(ε−1)
, (1)
where ε ∈ (0,+∞) is the elasticity of substitution between the clean and dirty production
sectors.
6A notable exception is Andre´ and Smulders (2004). Still, their specification does not make the total
cumulative extraction responsive to policies since the entire stock is always exhausted over the horizon.
7In either case, this amounts to take the heterogenity of deposits into account.
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The clean sector competitively produces the output Yc(t) from a flow Q(t) of renewable
energy supposed to be non polluting (e.g. solar, wind energies). For simplicity, we assume
this flow Q(t) to be constant, equal to Q, as if it was produced from a constant flow of
the archetypical renewable labor energy.8
The dirty sector’s output Yd(t) is competitively produced from a flow R(t) of non-
renewable resource supposed to be polluting (e.g. fossil fuels).9 This flow is costlessly
extracted from a fixed stock S0 of Hotelling reserves:
S˙(t) = −R(t), (2)
where S(t) is the remaining stock of reserves to be exploited at date t ≥ 0 and where, as
in the rest of the paper, a dot on top of a variable means that this variable is differentiated
with respect to time.
Precisely, the clean and dirty sectors respectively produce Yc(t) and Yd(t) according
to the production functions
Yc(t) = Q(t)
1−α
∫ 1
0
Aci(t)
1−αxci(t)α di, (3)
Yd(t) = R(t)
1−α
∫ 1
0
Adi(t)
1−αxdi(t)α di, (4)
with 0 < α < 1. For each sector j = c, d there is a continuum of sector-specific interme-
diate goods indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]: xji(t) denotes the quantity of the intermediate good
i used in sector j. Moreover, Aji(t) denotes the contemporaneous quality level of this
intermediate good.
Technical change is directed in the sense that there are two R&D sectors, one ”clean”
and one ”dirty”, respectively associated with the clean and the dirty production sectors,
8For instance, Q(t) is produced from the labor quantity LQ(t) only, according to the constant-return-
to-scale production function Q(t) = βLQ(t), with LQ(t) = LQ. Also for simplicity, the use of the
resource input R(t) in the other (dirty) sector will not require any labor energy. Had we assumed a flow
of homogeneous labor to be allocated to the clean and dirty sectors, as in Acemoglu et al. (2012), our
results would not have changed in any fundamental manner. Indeed, what ultimately matters for the
equilibrium allocation to exhibit a trade-off between the two sectors is that some inputs – at least one –
are used in both of them. As will be clear later on, these inputs are the intermediate ones.
9The analysis focuses on the policy-induced changes in the extraction pattern, in equilibrium outcomes
where pollution is not internalized and in absence of direct externality-corrective policies. Thus, the
polluting character of the resource need not be explicitly modeled. All along this character will remain
implicit.
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and respectively aimed to improve the quality level Aji(t) of intermediate goods specific
to those sectors.
In each R&D sector j = c, d a number Lji(t) of atomistic scientists are dedicated
to improving the quality level Aji(t) of the intermediate good i ∈ [0, 1]. Each scientist
in the R&D sector j has an instantaneous time-invariant and sector-specific probability
ηj ∈ (0, 1) of being the successful innovator. In case such a success occurs in sector j
on the part of one of the Lji(t) scientists, the quality level Aji(t) rises by γAji(t) with
γ > 0, which means that the new version of the associated intermediate good is more
productive; otherwise, that is absent any such success, Aji(t) remains unchanged. Thus,
at any date t ≥ 0, given the contemporaneous quality level Aji(t) and the number of
scientists Lji(t), it can be established that the expected instantaneous rise in Aji(t) is
given by the standard law of motion
A˙ji(t) = γAji(t)ηjLji(t), ∀j = c, d, ∀i ∈ [0, 1]. (5)
The arrival of innovation-generated intermediate-good versions raises the issue of how
property rights are defined; an issue at the core of modern economic theories accounting
for private incentives to perform R&D. Acemoglu et al. (2012) assume that any successful
scientist is given a temporary monopoly right over the benefit derived from sales of the
intermediate-good version generated by her innovation. In their discrete-time framework,
they assume such patents are only enforced over the smallest definable unit of time, that is
a period. In the long-run perspective of growth theory, the normalization is meaningful.10
Most importantly, it is particularly convenient as it rules out the possibility, technically
unmanageable in such models, that an innovation occurs in one sector while rights over
the last intermediate-good version are still being enforced.
The assumption has a clear counterpart in our continuous-time model, implying that
any patent is only enforced at the very date when the innovation occurs. Even when time
is continuous, the crucial existence of quasi-rents which motivate R&D investments is
compatible with the normalization. As we shall see, the assumption thus reproduces the
10Since in practice intellectual property rights are enforced for a finite-time duration, the assumption
is arguably stronger than the often-made alternative one that rights last forever.
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standard structure of endogenous innovation processes in the simplest possible manner.
On the other hand, the innovation process need not be continuous. To avoid discontinuity
in intermediate goods pricing, however, we strictly follow Acemoglu et al. (2012): when
no scientist is successful in one sector, the monopoly right survives and is randomly
allocated to any potential entrepreneur, who then exploits the last intermediate-good
version.
In either case, at each date t ≥ 0, there is always a single intermediate good xji(t) of
quality level Aji(t), which is produced by a monopoly, according to the linear production
function
xji(t) =
1
ψ
yji(t), j = c, d, i ∈ [0, 1] , (6)
with ψ > 0 and where yji(t) is an amount of final good.
The preferences of the representative, infinitely-lived household, are represented by
the intertemporal utility function
U =
∫ +∞
0
ln
(
C(t)
)
e−ρt dt, (7)
where ρ is a constant discount rate.11 For our purpose, the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution does not play any crucial role; the logarithmic form of the felicity function
thus normalizes this elasticity to unity for simplicity.
Households are endowed with the constant flow L > 0 of labor energy; each unit of
labor is competitively supplied by one scientist to the R&D sectors. Normalizing the
mass of scientists to unity, it must be that∫ 1
0
Lci(t) di+
∫ 1
0
Ldi(t) di = 1, ∀t ≥ 0. (8)
Last, the final good produced at each date t ≥ 0 is either used for consumption or for
the production of clean and dirty intermediate goods:
Y (t) = C(t) +
∫ 1
0
yci(t) +
∫ 1
0
ydi(t). (9)
11An explicit modeling of environmental damages would have raised the issue of how households are
affected by those damages. The rest of the analysis would have remained unchanged with separable
damages, under which the marginal utility solely depends on consumption.
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3. Input Demands by Production Sectors
As is usual, we choose the final good as the numeraire good; its price is normalized to
unity. In the rest of the paper, pji(t), pQ(t), pR(t) will respectively denote the price of
the intermediate good i ∈ [0, 1] used in sector j = c, d, the price of the clean renewable
resource and the price of the dirty non-renewable resource. Because they are competitive,
the final sector and the clean and dirty production sectors can be aggregated without loss
of generality so that their joint problem simply consists in the maximization of their total
profit
piY (t) =
[
Yc(t)
(ε−1)/ε + Yd(t)(ε−1)/ε
]ε/(ε−1)
(10)
−
∑
j=c,d
∫ 1
0
pji(t)xji(t) di− pQ(t)Q(t)− pR(t)R(t),
where prices are taken as parameters.
3.1 Resource Demand
As one can anticipate in light of Sinn’s (2008) analysis, resource demand will turn out to
play the most fundamental role in the determination of the speed at which the resource
is extracted.
The first-order condition for the choice of resource input R(t) writes pR(t) = (1 −
α)Y (t)1/εYd(t)
(ε−1)/ε/R(t), which equalizes the marginal productivity of the resource in-
put to its price. Using (1), the marginal productivity of the resource can be expressed in
such a way that
pR(t) =
(1− α)Y (t)
R(t)
1
(Yc(t)/Yd(t))(ε−1)/ε + 1
, (11)
which must be interpreted using the concept of conditional factor demand; precisely,
the resource productivity as given by the right-hand side of (11) is the inverse resource
demand function, conditional upon the amount of final output Y (t).
As (11) shows, the conditional resource demand function only depends on the relative
contribution Yc(t)/Yd(t) of sectors c and d to the economy, yet in a way that involves
sectors’ degree of substitutability/complementarity ε. Smulders and Di Maria (2012)
recently pointed at the crucial and intricate channels by which technological change de-
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termines inputs demand. In a multi-sector context, formula (11) further shows the role of
the relative contribution of sectors: for a given output level, the relative contribution of
sectors completely summarizes the determinants of resource marginal productivity and
thus of total resource demand. The rest of the analysis will examine how the relative
sectors’ contribution is affected by R&D policies, thus making the following proposition
a central result of the paper.
Proposition 1 A rise in the relative contribution of the clean sector to the economy
causes the conditional resource demand function
ı) to decrease if the clean and dirty sectors are (gross) substitutes (ε > 1) or
ıı) to increase if these sectors are (gross) complements (ε < 1).
3.2 Intermediate Good Quantities
On the one hand, the first-order conditions for the choice of quantities xci(t) and xdi(t)
of clean and dirty intermediate goods maximizing (10) are
pci(t) = αY (t)
1/εYc(t)
−1/ε
[
Q(t)Aci(t)
xci(t)
]1−α
and (12)
pdi(t) = αY (t)
1/εYd(t)
−1/ε
[
R(t)Adi(t)
xdi(t)
]1−α
, (13)
which give the production sectors’ inverse demands for intermediate goods.
On the other hand, our assumptions imply the standard property that at each date
t ≥ 0, all intermediate goods xji(t), j = c, d, i ∈ [0, 1], are monopolistically supplied. By
(6), producing a quantity xji(t) of intermediate good requires an amount ψxji(t) of final
good. The profit derived from this activity thus writes
piji(t) = xji(t) [pji(t)− ψ] , (14)
where pji(t) is given by (12) and (13) because monopolies integrate the sensitiveness of
the demand they face. In this context, monopoly prices pji(t) exhibit a mark-up above
the marginal cost ψ,
pji(t) =
ψ
α
, ∀j = c, d, ∀i ∈ [0, 1], (15)
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and turn out to be time-invariant as well as independent of the sector j = c, d to which
they are dedicated and of the type of intermediate good i ∈ [0, 1].
As a result, inverse demand functions (12) and (13) imply that the equilibrium quan-
tity of intermediate good xji(t) proportionally depends on the quality level Aji(t) in a
way that is independent of the type of intermediate good i ∈ [0, 1]. Making use of this
property, Appendix A combines the relative contribution of the clean sector Yc(t)/Yd(t)
obtained from production functions (3) and (4) with the relative marginal productivity
derived from (12) and (13) and shows the following identity:
Yc(t)
Yd(t)
=
[
xc(t)
xd(t)
]ε/(ε−1)
, (16)
where xc(t) ≡
∫ 1
0
xci(t) di and xd(t) ≡
∫ 1
0
xdi(t) di denote the average quantities of inter-
mediate goods respectively used in the clean and dirty production sectors.12
As (16) shows, at the production sector’s optimum, changes in the relative contri-
bution of the clean sector are completely summarized by changes in the relative use of
intermediate goods by this sector. This is the message of the following lemma which will
later turn out to be particularly useful.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, the relative contribution of the clean sector to the economy
ı) increases with the relative use of clean intermediate goods if the clean and dirty sectors
are (gross) substitutes (ε > 1) and
ıı) decreases with it if these sectors are (gross) complements (ε < 1).
4. R&D-Support Policies and Directed Technical Change
This section investigates how R&D and intermediate activities are affected by R&D-
support policies. For that purpose, we first establish how economic resources are allocated
to competing R&D sectors in equilibrium.
When an innovation occurs at date t ≥ 0, giving rise to a new, more productive
type of intermediate good xji(t), j = c, d, i ∈ [0, 1], the innovator is entitled with an
12The notations are introduced here for simplicity. It will shortly turn out to be true that xj(t) = xji(t),
for all j = c, d, for all i ∈ [0, 1].
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exclusive right over the profits piji(t) immediately derived from the sales of the new
intermediate good. The most basic and meaningful way to support R&D activities is to
subsidize innovators’ profits. Let λj(t) ≥ 1 be the time-varying subsidy factor applied
to any innovator’s profit in sector j = c, d. Hence, the inclusive-of-subsidy benefit from
innovating is13
Vji(t) = λj(t)piji(t), (17)
where it follows from the analysis of the last section (formula (14) with equilibrium price
(15)) that piji(t) can be expressed as a function of xji(t) only:
piji(t) =
(1− α)ψ
α
xji(t). (18)
At each date t ≥ 0, Lji(t) scientists are dedicated to improving the quality level
of intermediate good i ∈ [0, 1] used in sector j = c, d, each having the instantaneous
probability ηj of being the successful innovator. The total profit of this R&D sector
writes
piR&Dji(t) = ηjLji(t)Vji(t)− w(t)Lji(t), (19)
where w(t) is the wage rate and Vji(t) is given by (17).
As is well known, it is theoretically possible in directed-technical-change models that
piR&Dji(t) is strictly negative for any strictly positive Lji(t), so that innovations do not
occur in all sectors (e.g. Acemoglu, 2008, Ch. 15). In such contexts, R&D-support
policies can only induce innovations in all sectors when they are stringent enough and
may be neutral otherwise. As a matter of fact, specific R&D activities currently take
13Our modeling choice to follow Acemoglu et al. (2012) in assuming the duration of patents to be
normalized to the smallest definable unit of time makes expression (17) much simpler than in traditional
treatments where the benefit from innovating not only involves contemporaneous monopoly profits, but
also the discounted stream of future expected ones. As explained in the introduction, the simplification
does not imply any departure from the regular endogenous-growth mechanism where prospects of quasi-
rents motivate R&D investments. In fact, the rest of the analysis would have remained formally the same
if patents were assumed to be enforced for a long time, while the rate at which profits are discounted were
taken as given. The proof goes as follows. Let parameter θ(t) be this given rate of discount, which consists
of the interest rate and possibly of an instantaneous risk of patents’ erosion in the form described by Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 6). Then, expression (17) would be Vji(t) =
∫ +∞
t
λj(s)piji(s)e
− ∫ s
t
θ(u) du ds.
Differentiating with respect to time by Leibniz rule would give V˙ji(t)/Vji(t)−θ(t) = −
(
λj(t)piji(t)
)
/Vji(t),
for the two sectors j = c, d. However, the analysis would only change to this extent: the R&D profit
(19) as well as the free-entry condition (20) would still apply to both sectors. Because the latter implies
the growth rate of Vji(t) to be the same in the two sectors, the fundamental no-arbitrage equation (21)
as well as the rest of the analysis would then hold in the same manner as under our assumption.
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place simultaneously in resource and non-resource sectors. Thus, two main reasons make
it interesting to study cases where the allocation of labor resources to several R&D sectors
is interior. First, they are empirically relevant. Second, from a theoretical perspective,
only those cases deliver a clear message on the direction in which policies can distort the
economy.
In the rest of the analysis, we assume away the possibility of a corner allocation
of labor to R&D sectors and so restrict attention to situations where this allocation is
interior. Appendix B derives the underlying conditions on parameters.14 Thus, labor
entry is profitable in the two sectors; in any such equilibria, arbitrage possibilities result
in the standard free-entry condition which applies to the clean and to the dirty sectors
in a similar manner. From (19), it must be that
ηcVci(t) = ηdVdi(t) = w(t), ∀i ∈ [0, 1], (20)
which means that the marginal productivity of scientists is equalized across R&D sectors.
The above free-entry condition has two main implications. The first one amounts to a
simplification. The equilibrium allocation of labor as per (20) implies that the net benefit
of innovating Vji(t), while varying across sectors j = c, d according to the probability
parameters ηc and ηd, does not depend on the type of intermediate good i ∈ [0, 1] the
associated innovation improves. By (17) and (18), the same property applies to profits
piji(t) and to intermediate good quantities xji(t). In the rest of the analysis, we will
make use of the notations Vj(t) = Vji(t) and pij(t) = piji(t), while our earlier definition
xj(t) ≡
∫ 1
0
xji(t) di now becomes the equilibrium identity xj(t) = xji(t), for any j = c, d
and i ∈ [0, 1].
The second implication of (20) is an essential piece of the paper’s demonstration.
The free-entry condition tells that the relative inclusive-of-subsidy benefit of innovating
Vc(t)/Vd(t) is determined in a way that is irrespective of subsidy rates λc(t) and λd(t).
Recalling that by (17), the net value Vj(t) only depends on the subsidy rate λj(t) and on
14In the laisser-faire equilibrium without R&D-support policies, the dirty R&D sector is always active.
For the clean R&D sector to be active as well, expected prospects of improvements, which is given by
the product of the quality improvement rate with the innovation probability, must be sufficiently large.
As policies are introduced, the conditions for the allocation to be interior further depend on them.
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pij(t), we obtain the more enlightening condition
ηcλc(t)pic(t) = ηdλd(t)pid(t), (21)
which shows that in absence of arbitrage, any support to the clean sector by say an
increase in the relative subsidy λc(t)/λd(t) is necessarily compensated by a change in
relative profits pic(t)/pid(t) of opposite direction.
No-arbitrage conditions are the keystone of equilibria in economies with competing
investment possibilities. While absent in one-sector endogenous-growth models, directed-
technical-change models reveal that such conditions must prevail at the R&D stage, that
returns to investing in R&D must equalize across all R&D sectors. Thus, taking a full
account of the process by which specific R&D investments are implemented as a response
to economic incentives, clearly yields the above result that is otherwise not so intuitive.
Another surprising aspect of the demonstration may be that the result holds regardless
of the effect of R&D-support subsidies on the technological bias.
Keeping in mind from (18) that profits of the intermediate sectors can be expressed
as functions of intermediate good quantities only, we immediately obtain the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 In any interior equilibrium allocation, the relative use of clean intermediate
goods always decreases in the relative subsidy to clean R&D activities.
Lemma 2 provides an essential result of the paper which is not the most intuitive
one. Shortly below, it will nicely combine with Lemma 1 and with Proposition 1 so as to
determine the effect of R&D-support policies on resource demand.
5. R&D-Support Policies and the Green Paradox
5.1 Transmission Channel
The first part of this section aims at summarizing the effect of R&D-support policies on
resource demand. For that, we can rely on the results established earlier. On the one
hand, Lemma 2 states the effect of R&D-support policies on the relative use of interme-
diate goods by the clean and dirty sectors. On the other hand, Lemma 1 tells us that
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the relative use of intermediate goods completely summarizes the relative contribution
of the clean and dirty sectors. The combination of Lemma 1 with Lemma 2 immediately
yields the following proposition on the effect of R&D-support policies on the relative
contribution of the clean and dirty sectors.
Proposition 2 A rise in the relative subsidy to clean R&D activities causes the equilib-
rium relative contribution of the clean sector to the economy
ı) to decrease if the clean and dirty sectors are (gross) substitutes (ε > 1) and
ıı) to increase if these sectors are (gross) complements (ε < 1).
Formally speaking, Proposition 2 results from the combination of identity (16) that
Yc(t)/Yd(t) = [xc(t)/xd(t)]
ε/(ε−1), with condition (21) that ηcλc(t)pic(t) = ηdλd(t)pid(t),
making use of (18), which implies that relative profits pic(t)/pid(t) equal relative interme-
diate quantities xc(t)/xd(t). Hence, in any interior equilibrium, we have
Yc(t)
Yd(t)
=
[
λd(t)ηd
λc(t)ηc
]ε/(ε−1)
. (22)
Let us now come back to resource demand. Substituting (22) in expression (11), gives
the conditional inverse resource demand
pR(t) =
(1− α)Y (t)
R(t)
Λ(t), (23)
where, for notational simplicity, we make use of the policy index Λ(t) defined as
Λ(t) ≡ 1
1 + λd(t)ηd
λc(t)ηc
. (24)
The index Λ(t) is a basic measure of the relative support to clean R&D activities. For
what follows, it only matters that Λ(t) is monotonically increasing in the relative subsidy
to clean R&D λc(t)/λd(t). Thus, equation (23) expresses the conditional resource demand,
no longer as a function of Yc(t)/Yd(t) as in (11), but directly as a function of R&D-support
policies.
Neither formula (23) nor definition (24) involves the elasticity of substitution ε. Thus
it turns out that, taking the output-level condition Y (t) as given in formula (23), a rise
in the relative clean-R&D subsidy causes resource demand to increase, regardless of the
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pattern of substitutatility/complementarity between the sectors. Indeed, although the
role of the sectoral elasticity of substitution ε appears crucial in Proposition 2 (relation
between R&D-support policies and sectors’ contribution) and in Proposition 1 (relation
between sectors’ contribution and resource demand), this role completely vanishes when
the results combine to determine the overall effect of policies on resource demand. To sum
up, the final message arising from Propositions 1 and 2 is independent of sectors’ degree of
substitutability/complementarity: a rise in the relative clean-R&D subsidy always causes
resource demand to increase.
So far, results have been established as static effects holding at each date t of the
time set [0,+∞). Since the resource is non-renewable, its extraction pattern cannot be
directly deduced from the above static analysis; similarly, the effects of R&D-support
policies on the extraction speed cannot be deduced from the above static result arising
from Propositions 1 and 2. The next and last section extends the above result from the
static frame of the previous sections to its dynamic counterpart.
5.2 Impact of R&D-Support Policies on the Resource Extraction Pattern
Extending the above static results summarized by formula (23) so as to derive the effects
of R&D-support policies on the speed of resource extraction further requires taking into
account intertemporal decisions which determine the dynamic equilibrium.
On the one hand, households’ consumption/saving arbitrage determines the growth
rate of final output Y (t) in (23). The maximization of the intertemporal utility objective
(7), subject to any intertemporal budget constraint arising under a perfect financial
market, yields the standard Ramsey-Keynes condition: gC(t) = r(t) − ρ, where r(t) is
the rate of interest endogenously determined on the financial market, and where, as in
the rest of the paper, the symbol g with a variable subscript denotes the growth rate of
this variable. Appendix C shows that, although consumption is not the exclusive use of
final output, the Ramsey-Keynes condition applying to the former also dictates the law
of motion of the latter. Formally,
gY (t) = r(t)− ρ, ∀t ≥ 0, (25)
must hold in any dynamic equilibrium.
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On the other hand, the same assumption that there exists a perfect financial market
implies that the standard rule of Hotelling must hold, meaning that any unit of reserves
must fetch the same revenue in present value. Under our simplifying, although conven-
tional in growth models, assumption that extraction is costless, the rule writes
gpR(t) = r(t), ∀t ≥ 0, (26)
which must be satisfied in any dynamic equilibrium.
Let us now come back to the conditional expression of resource demand (23) and to
its dynamic implications. Log-differentiating both sides and making use of the Keynes-
Ramsey rule (25) and of the Hotelling rule (26), the following expression of the speed of
extraction immediately follows
gR(t) = gΛ(t)− ρ, (27)
where the effects of the interest rate on gY (t) and gpR(t) have canceled out.
We are left with the following statement which concludes our analysis.
Proposition 3 Under the assumptions of this paper, in any dynamic equilibrium, a
gradual rise of the relative subsidy to clean R&D activities over time induces resource
extraction to be less rapid, irrespective of the pattern of substitutability/complementarity
between the clean and dirty production sectors.
This final result should be interpreted through the lens of the preceding static mes-
sages of Propositions 1 and 2. Their combination and their dynamic extension tells the
following. A gradual rise of the relative subsidy to clean R&D, whatever its other dy-
namic effects on the economy’s structure, will always contribute to gradually increasing
the demand for the resource. The rest is standard: the resulting rise in future demand
relative to early demand leads market forces to exploit less resource at early dates and
so more at distant ones.
6. Conclusion
Technical improvements in the production of clean substitutes to dirty non-renewable
resources have been considered tantamount to policies that reduce the demand for those
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resources (e.g. Sinn, 2008). In this context, such technical improvements, whether ex-
pected to take place in the long-term future, or gradually induced by more-and-more
stringent R&D-support policies, would cause an undesirable green paradox phenomenon.
The pessimistic argument has been made in parsimonious models, either adopting a
partial-equilibrium approach taking the technology as exogenous, or assuming a single
resource-consuming sector.
This paper shows that the conjecture is wrong. Borrowing standard assumptions
from the modern-economic-growth literature, the analysis takes a full account of the en-
dogenous directed R&D process by which productivity is specifically enhanced in clean
renewable-resource and dirty non-renewable-resource sectors, and of the policy instru-
ments by which such R&D activities can be promoted. We find that a gradual support
to R&D activities aimed to improve productivity in clean sectors increases, among other
effects, the long-run productivity and thus the demand for the non-renewable resource.
From a policy perspective, the message delivered by the analysis is more optimistic than
the aforementioned conjecture. Supporting clean R&D sectors does not cause a green
paradox phenomenon.
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APPENDICES
A Proof of identity (16)
Substituting pci(t) = pdi(t) = ψ/α from (15) into equalities (12) and (13) and dividing the
left and right sides of the latter by both sides of the former yields the following expression
which gives the relative contribution of sectors(
Yc(t)
Yd(t)
)1/ε
=
(
Q(t)
R(t)
)1−α(
Aci(t)/xci(t)
Adi(t)/xdi(t)
)1−α
. (A.1)
In this identity, the ratios Aji(t)/xji(t) are independent of i ∈ [0, 1] for each j = c, d as
shown by (12) and (13) after the substitution of pji(t) from (15).
The later property implies that (3) and (4) can be rewritten with
∫ 1
0
Aji(t)
1−αxji(t)α di =
(Aji(t)/xji(t))
1−α ∫ 1
0
xji(t) di where by definition
∫ 1
0
xji(t) di ≡ xj(t). Dividing the ob-
tained expressions of equalities (3) and (4) by each other yields
Yc(t)
Yd(t)
=
(
Q(t)
R(t)
)1−α(
Aci(t)/xci(t)
Adi(t)/xdi(t)
)1−α
xc(t)
xd(t)
. (A.2)
Finally, dividing (A.1) by (A.2) immediately gives identity (16).
B Allocation of Scientists to the Clean and Dirty R&D Sectors
The property shown in Appendix A that ratios Aji(t)/xji(t) are independent of i ∈ [0, 1]
for each j = c, d, combined with the result of Section 4 that xji(t) = xj(t), for all i ∈ [0, 1]
and each j = c, d, implies that all Aci(t) and all Adi(t), for any i ∈ [0, 1], must always
follow the same average trajectory. In light of (5), this also implies that scientists in
each R&D sector j = c, d are evenly allocated over the range i ∈ [0, 1]; we can define
Lj(t) = Lji(t), which is also the total number of scientists
∫ 1
0
Lji(t) employed in the R&D
sector j = c, d. In this context, summing over the range i ∈ [0, 1] all equations (5) and
making use of the variable Aj(t) ≡
∫ 1
0
Aji(t) di to denote the average quality level in each
sector j = c, d, we obtain the average quality levels’ laws of motion
gAj(t) = γηjLj(t), j = c, d, (B.1)
where the symbol g with a variable subscript denotes the growth rate of the variable. We
are going to make use of this equation shortly below.
Moreover, proceeding the same way as Appendix A with the above mentioned property
that ratios Aji(t)/xji(t) are independent of i ∈ [0, 1] for each j = c, d, (3) and (4) can
respectively be expressed as follows:
Yc(t) = Q(t)
1−αAc(t)1−αxc(t)α, (B.2)
Yd(t) = R(t)
1−αAd(t)1−αxd(t)α. (B.3)
Log-differentiating these two equations and simplifying with (B.1) and (27), we obtain
gYc(t) = (1− α)γηcLc(t) + αgxc(t), (B.4)
gYd(t) = (1− α)γηdLd(t) + αgxd(t) + (1− α)
(
gΛ(t)− ρ
)
. (B.5)
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From (22), it follows that gYc(t)− gYd(t) =
(
gλd(t)− gλc(t)
)
ε/(ε−1). Substituting the
above expressions (B.4) and (B.5), simplifying by using the fact that gxc(t) − gxd(t) =
gλd(t)− gλc(t) because xc(t)/xd(t) = λd(t)/λc(t) from (22) and (16), and rearranging, we
obtain
(1−α)γ(ηcLc(t)− ηdLd(t)) = ( ε
ε− 1 − α
)(
gλd(t)− gλc(t)
)
+ (1−α)(gΛ(t)− ρ). (B.6)
Using that Ld(t) = 1− Lc(t) from (8), and rearranging adequately give the following
expression of the labor quantity employed in the clean R&D sector in equilibrium:
Lc(t) =
1
(1− α)γ(ηc + ηd)
[(
ε
ε− 1 − α
)(
gλd(t)− gλc(t)
)
+ (1− α)(gΛ(t)− ρ)+ (1− α)γηd] .
(B.7)
The formula shows that R&D-support policies affect the equilibrium allocation of scien-
tists in a complex manner. Absent any R&D-support policies, gλc(t) = gλd(t) = gΛ(t) = 0.
In that case, the formula simply becomes
Lc(t) =
(γηd − ρ)
γηc + γηd
. (B.8)
Still in this context, it is easy to see that Lc(t) > 1, and thus Ld(t) > 0, are always valid.
To guarantee that the allocation of scientists is interior so that Lc(t) > 0, we further need
the sufficient condition that γηd > ρ.
C Proof of (25)
The proof given in the main text relies on the equality gY (t) = gC(t), which can be
obtained as follows.
Substituting the price pci(t) = ψ/α from (15) into (12), and using the property
that the ratios Aci(t)/xci(t), for all i ∈ [0, 1] do not depend on i (see Appendix A),
so that they can be replaced by the ratio Ac(t)/xc(t), yield the relation (ψ/α
2)Y (t)−1/ε =
Yc(t)
−1/ε(Q(t)Ac(t)/xc(t))1−α. Using the simplified expression of sector c’s production
function (B.2), the term
(
Q(t)Ac(t)/xc(t)
)1−α
can be replaced by Yc(t)/xc(t). Replacing
and rearranging, one immediately obtains the following expression:
Yc(t)
(ε−1)/ε =
ψ
α2
xc(t)
Y (t)1/ε
. (C.1)
Proceeding in the exact same way with variables relative to sector d instead of c, by
using (13) and (B.3), instead of (12) and (B.2), one obtains the symmetric formula
Yd(t)
(ε−1)/ε =
ψ
α2
xd(t)
Y (t)1/ε
. (C.2)
Introducing the expressions of Yc(t)
(ε−1)/ε and Yd(t)(ε−1)/ε given by (C.1) and (C.2) into
the production function (1), isolating the factor
(
(ψ/α2)Y (t)−1/ε
)ε/(ε−1)
and rearranging,
all powers involving ε cancel out to yield the expression
Y (t) =
ψ
α2
(xc(t) + xd(t)) , (C.3)
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which we will use shortly below.
Finally, taking Equation (9), substituting yji(t) = ψxji(t) from (6), and making use
of the notations xc(t) = xci(t) and xd(t) = xdi(t), for all i ∈ [0, 1] (see in Section 4 the
text immediately following Equation (20)), one obtains the following relation:
C(t) = Y (t)− ψ (xc(t) + xd(t)) . (C.4)
By substitution of ψ (xc(t) + xd(t)) from (C.3), we obtain the linear relation between C(t)
and Y (t)
C(t) = Y (t)(1− α2), (C.5)
which implies that the growth rates of the two variables are identical in any equilibrium.
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